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The (Neglected) Employment Dimension of the World Trade Organization 
 
Steve Charnovitz* 
 
 
 
 A key assumption underlying the World Trade Organization (WTO) is that its program of 
trade negotiations will “strengthen the world economy and lead to more trade, investment, 
employment and income growth throughout the world.”1 Indeed, that was the first point included in 
the Marrakesh Declaration of April 1994 that consummated the Uruguay Round and established the 
WTO. In my view, the WTO truly is strengthening the “world economy”2 and promoting trade and 
investment in many parts of the world.3 Yet the rest of the thesis is debatable. Is it necessarily true 
that the WTO and the trade negotiations it sponsors are increasing employment and income growth 
throughout the world? Indeed, even aggregating the world economy into one planetary unit, one 
wonders whether increased trade (and its ensuing dynamic efficiencies) inevitably increases the 
                                                
* Forthcoming, Social Issues, Globalization and International Institutions: Labour Rights and the 
EU, ILO, OECD and WTO (Virginia Leary & Daniel Warner (eds.), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2006), available at <http://www.brill.nl/product_id23991.htm). 
 
1Marrakesh Declaration of 15 April 1994, para. 1, available at 
<http://www.worldtradelaw.net/uragreements/index.htm>. 
2The meaning of “world economy” is ambiguous. It could be the aggregate of all national economies 
or the portion of that aggregate involved in or affected by transborder transactions.  On the latter 
definition, there could be some individuals who live outside the world economy.  To “strengthen” an 
economy is to assist it to utilize full capacity and to grow. 
3See Anne O. Krueger, Wilful Ignorance: The Struggle to Convince the Free Trade Skeptics, 3 World 
Trade Review 483 (2004). 
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quantity of global employment. Even if it does, what is the quality of the jobs created?  Does the 
WTO promote what the International Labour Organization (ILO) calls “decent work”4?  
 Such questions underlie the subject of this article—the neglected employment dimension of 
the WTO. As a non-economist, I do not propose to answer these questions empirically. Instead, the 
purpose of this article is to point out how little the WTO does to monitor these issues or to design 
trade rules with sensitivity to the objective of employment growth. So far, the WTO has not set any 
quantitative goals for income or employment growth. The trade ministers have alluded to their desire 
that the WTO promote the “benefit and welfare of their peoples,”5 but the ministers are lackadaisical 
about keeping WTO negotiations on schedule.  In view of the broad nature of international trade law 
today, the WTO seems to be overlooking many opportunities to promote a positive employment 
agenda. 
 This article proceeds in four parts: Part I reviews the WTO’s actions, and inactions, on the 
issue of employment. Part I also provides an overview of the employment-related provisions of WTO 
law. Part II provides an historical context for thinking about the status of employment issues in the 
WTO. Part III presents an agenda for incorporating an employment and social dimension into the 
work of the WTO. Part IV concludes. 
I.  The WTO and Employment Policy 
 In its first decade, the WTO did not show much sensitivity toward the plight of the workers of 
the world who produce goods and perform services being traded. Aside from occasional strikes by 
                                                
4For a brief discussion of whether “decent work” is the right objective for the ILO’s efforts, see Philip 
Alston, “Core Labour Standards” and the Transformation of the International Labour Rights Regime, 
15 EJIL 457, 488–89 (2004. Alston’s article raises important questions about the ILO’s focus on core 
labor standards, a topic he returns to in this volume.  For an engaging response, see Brian Langille, 
Core Labour Rights – the True Story (Reply to Alston), this volume. 
5Marrakesh Declaration, supra note 1, para. 2. 
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WTO Secretariat bureaucrats who claim to be underpaid,6 the WTO lacks an employment dimension. 
Despite many suggestions that it do so, the WTO did not extend observer status to the ILO pursuant 
to Article V of the WTO Agreement.7 Furthermore, the WTO did not sign a “Cooperation 
Agreement” with the ILO even though the WTO did sign them with the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund.8 Although it has set up a Committee on Trade and Development and a 
Committee on Trade and Environment, the WTO has not seen fit to establish a Committee on Trade 
and Employment.9 Indeed, the topic of employment and labor standards is so much a taboo in the 
halls of the WTO that after delegates heard that the Director-General of the ILO had been invited to 
speak at the WTO’s 1996 Ministerial Conference in Singapore, there was so much grumbling that the 
chair of the WTO General Council was forced to rescind the invitation.10 That retreat was lamentable 
and also symbolic of the distaste of the trading system for matters relating to workers and 
employment. 
                                                
6See WTO Work to Rule Threat, Financial Times, 23 October 1997, at 8; Frances Williams, WTO 
Staff to Step Up Action Over Pay, Financial Times, 10 December 2002, at 16; Frances Williams, 
WTO Staff to Disrupt World Bank Meeting, Financial Times, 13 May 2003, at 10. 
7See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), art. V:1. 
8See WTO News, WTO and World Bank Sign Cooperation Agreement, 28 April 1997; Coherence in 
Global Economic Policymaking and Cooperation between the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank, 
WT/TF/COH/S/9, Note by the Secretariat, 11 October 2004.  
9Some analysts have commended the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment as a successful 
experiment. See e.g., Gregory Shaffer, “If Only We Were Elephants”: The Political Economy of the 
WTO’s Treatment of Trade and Environment Matters, in Daniel L.M. Kennedy & James D. 
Southwick (eds.), The Political Economy of International Trade Law. Essays in Honor of Robert E. 
Hudec (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002) at 349, 381. 
10Labours of Love, Financial Times, 6 December 1996, at 13; Drusilla K. Brown, International Labor 
Standards in the World Trade Organization and the International Labor Organization, The Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, July/August 2000, at 105. 
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 The Preamble to the WTO Agreement affirms that trade and economic relations should be 
conducted with a view to achieving listed goals, including “ensuring full employment . . .”11, and yet 
little attention to employment was institutionalized into the operative provisions of the treaty. Article 
III of the WTO Agreement states: “With a view to achieving greater coherence in global economic 
policy-making, the WTO shall cooperate, as appropriate, with the International Monetary Fund and 
with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and its affiliated agencies.”12 
Unfortunately, that provision takes a narrow view of “coherence” in global economic policymaking, 
and does not give consideration to employment policymaking. Of course, the WTO Agreement does 
affirm that the WTO General Council “shall make appropriate arrangements for effective cooperation 
with other intergovernmental organizations that have responsibilities related to those of the WTO.”13 
That mandate is sufficient to justify cooperative arrangements with the ILO. But so far the General 
Council has not sought or agreed to such an arrangement.  
 The neglect of employment issues within the WTO seems likely to persist. The WTO website 
explains that “there is no work” on the subject of labor standards being carried out at the WTO and it 
would be “wrong” to assume that this subject lies ahead.14 This statement refers to labor standards, 
however, and not to the broader issue of employment. Yet with very limited exceptions, the same 
                                                
11See WTO Agreement, Preamble, para. 2. The language about full employment was lifted directly 
from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) written in 1947.  In its decision in the 
Tariff Preferences case, the Appellate Body stated that the Preamble “informs” all WTO covered 
agreements. European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to 
Developing Countries, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS246/AB/R, para. 161 (adopted 20 April 
2004). 
12WTO Agreement, art. III:5. 
13WTO Agreement, art. V:1. Similar authority is found in GATT arts. XXXVI:7, XXXVIII:2(b)(c); 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), art. XXVI. 
14WTO, Labour Standards: Highly Controversial, available at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey5_e.htm>. 
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dismissive attitude seems to exist for employment. The most recent World Trade Report published by 
the WTO gives only scant attention to the labor market and job creation.15  
 Although less than five pages of the 200-page World Trade Report 2004 discuss labor issues, 
the substance of this analysis should be noted because it illustrates the WTO’s unsympathetic 
attitude. The overall point made is that the “social acceptance of trade reforms” can be a political 
constraint to such reform because of “pressure” from employees in import-competing sectors.16 The 
Report explains that while other reforms, such as “a reduction of legal minimum wages” will exert 
effects “across the economy,” trade liberalization is different because the adjustment costs tend to be 
concentrated in particular sectors of the economy.17 This pattern of concentration, it is said, can lead 
to “well organized resistance against trade reform.”18 In the Secretariat’s view, the “functioning of 
labor markets” has impact both on the size and length of the adjustment burden.19 For example, the 
Secretariat warns that “employment protection policies” may “discourage entrepreneurs from hiring 
the few workers needed for starting up a new company . . . .”20 Furthermore, it warns that “[h]igh 
minimum wages may lead to excessive lay-offs . . . .”21 Another factor the Secretariat analyzes is the 
level of unionization in import-competing sectors.  The Secretariat explains that higher unionization 
may increase resistance to liberalization and lead to “half-hearted adoption of reforms” or, even 
                                                
15See WTO, Exploring the Linkage Between the Domestic Policy Environment and International 
Trade, World Trade Report 2004. The issue of employment was absent from the World Trade Report 
2003. 
16World Trade Report 2004, supra note 15, at 181. 
17Id. at 182. 
18Id. 
19Id. at 183. 
20Id. 
21Id. 
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worse, “[trade] policy reversals, with negative consequences for adjustment.”22 Furthermore, 
according to the Secretariat, “trade is expected to decrease the demand for unskilled labour in 
industrial countries, and to decrease their wages relative to the wages of skilled workers.”23  
 On a more positive note, the Report briefly discusses the need for “more sophisticated safety 
nets” to reduce the adjustment burdens carried by the poorest workers.24 No details are given as to 
how to accomplish this. 
 Three problems are apparent in the Secretariat’s treatment of employment issues. First, by 
discussing the labor market merely as a constraint on trade liberalization, the Report seems to regard 
international trade as an end in itself rather than a means for humans to improve their happiness. The 
central challenge of economic development is how to weave together human resources, capital 
investment, technology, management, and good governance. Yet the Secretariat shows little 
appreciation for the larger context. Second, the implication in the Report that countries would be 
better off with less protection for employment, lower minimum wages, and less unionization shows a 
callous disregard for social values espoused by the international community. Third, in one area where 
the Secretariat could have collected information on better practices for carrying out worker 
adjustment programs, the Secretariat did not offer any useful advice. 
 In April 2003, the Secretariat published a Special Study on Adjustment by Marc Bacchetta 
and Marion Jansen, two staffers in the WTO Secretariat.25 Commissioning this Study was 
commendable, and was the first time that such an effort has been undertaken in the multilateral 
                                                
22Id. 
23Id. at 185. 
24Id. at 185-86. 
25Marc Bacchetta & Marion Jansen, Adjusting to Trade Liberalization, WTO Special Studies 7, April 
2003, available at <http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/special_studies_e.htm>. 
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trading system. The two authors make no claim that trade liberalization increases employment.26 
Instead, they focus on the pockets of industry and job displacement and point out that the adjustment 
costs from trade liberalization are likely to be small relative to the gains from trade. The Study 
provides a thoughtful handbook of the various policies available to governments to address these 
adjustment costs. Oddly, most of the attention in the 60-page study is directed to trade policies for 
delaying adjustment, such as WTO transition and phase-in periods, regular safeguards, special 
agricultural and textile safeguards, and antidumping duties. By contrast, the option of facilitating 
positive worker adjustment is squeezed into three pages.  
 One of the most perceptive observations in the study is that aid for dislocated workers can 
include both (1) short-run assistance to facilitate adjustment and achieve efficiency and (2) long-run 
equity transfers to compensate workers for income losses. The Study goes on to explain that tensions 
exist between these distinct objectives.27 As someone who worked in the United States on the worker 
assistance problem for many years, I believe that this particular insight has often not been appreciated 
by analysts who criticize shortcomings in achieving one of these objectives without paying due 
attention to the other. 
 This mild praise for the Study’s contributions on worker adjustment should be leavened by a 
brief recital of the Study’s weaknesses. First, it is more of a literature review than a real study, and 
the literature reviewed is drawn mainly from trade economists. Second, the Study is not detailed 
enough to provide help to a WTO Member government attempting to design programs to assist 
workers who lose their jobs as a result of trade. Third, although the authors note that the costs of 
                                                
26Id. at 18. 
27Id. at 23, 31 Another thoughtful observation is that making trade commitments in the WTO 
enhances the credibility of reform efforts and signals to the factors of production that adjustment will 
be necessary.  Id. at 39–40. 
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adjustment will often be four percent or less of the gains from trade,28 the Study makes no effort to 
consider how to channel more of these net gains into aiding dislocated workers.  
 So far, this article has pointed out how little the WTO has done on the topic of employment. 
To be sure, the WTO was set up to be a trade agency, not a labor agency. Nevertheless, one should 
recognize that the issue of employment is already embedded to a limited extent in WTO rules, and so 
the WTO does have some jurisdictional competence on employment. 
Employment Aspects of Current WTO Rules 
 The WTO Agreement and its annexes do not contain a labor chapter in the way that recent 
and emerging United States (U.S.) free trade agreements do.29 Indeed the term “worker” is not even 
mentioned in the WTO Agreement, as if the goods in international trade were immaculately 
produced. Although there is limited attention to labor, employment, and social matters in the covered 
WTO Agreements, no common thread of labor policy can be said to exist. The best way for 
explicating the labor-related elements of WTO law is to point out the specific rules in various 
agreements. 
 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has several provisions relating to 
employment, but all have been neglected. GATT Article XII states a commitment of governments to 
pay due regard to the “desirability of avoiding an uneconomic employment of productive 
resources.”30 Referring to safeguards related to the balance of payments, Article XII also provides a 
modicum of deference to domestic policies directed toward the achievement and maintenance of “full 
                                                
28Id. at 16–17. 
29See Thomas J. Manley & Luis Lauredo, International Labor Standards in Free Trade Agreements in 
the Americas, 18 Emory International Law Review 85 (2004). 
30GATT art. XII:3(a).  See also GATT art. XVIII:11 first sentence. 
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and productive employment.”31 In GATT Part IV, the objective of “social” advancement is noted 
alongside “economic” advancement.32 Nothing significant has resulted from any of these provisions. 
 Employment also plays a role in other WTO agreements covering trade in goods. For the 
purpose of invoking trade remedies, the impact of imports on wages and/or employment is a factor in 
determining the existence of injury.33 An import-restricting safeguard is to be imposed “only to the 
extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment.”34 In practice, 
however, since the term “adjustment” is not defined, the WTO has not required governments using 
safeguards to assure that employers (or their workers) are seeking to adjust to a global economy.35  
 The WTO rules regarding subsidies also contain some employment policy. Some of these 
rules support employment policy. For example, in defining when a domestic subsidy causes “serious 
prejudice” to a competing WTO member country, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (SCM Agreement) exempts one-time subsidies “to avoid acute social problems.”36 For 
developing countries, time-delimited privatization subsidies to cover “social costs” are exempt from 
the disciplines on actionable subsidies.37 For all countries, certain subsidies for agricultural training 
services are exempt from reduction commitments.38 On the other hand, other substantive rules do not 
                                                
31GATT art. XII:3(d). 
32GATT art. XXXVI:1(e). 
33Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement), art. 15.4; Agreement on 
Safeguards, art. 4.2(a); Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT (Antidumping 
Agreement), art. 3.4.  A similar reference appears in the now-terminated Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing, art. 6.3. 
34Agreement on Safeguards, art. 5.1. See also arts. 7.2, 7.4. 
35See Bacchetta & Jansen, supra note 25, at 50-52 (discussing the Safeguards Agreement). 
36SCM Agreement, art. 6.1(c). A subsidy causing serious prejudice will be actionable.  
37Id. art. 27.13. 
38Agreement on Agriculture, Annex 2, para. 2(c). 
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support employment policy.  For example, the rules against export subsidies prohibit the remission of 
“social welfare” charges upon exportation.39 For domestic subsidies, a complaining government 
cannot claim that a subsidy in one country is displacing or impeding its exports to a third country 
when the complaining country has suffered strikes affecting its exports.40 Initially, the SCM 
Agreement removed its disciplines on subsidies for a disadvantaged region suffering a spike in 
unemployment.41 But that forbearance expired in 2000, and so high unemployment is no longer a 
justification for a subsidy.42  
 Note that all government subsidies for workers or for social costs will be subject to the control 
of the Byrd Amendment decision. In that controversial holding, the WTO Appellate Body ruled that 
companies suffering injury from dumping or foreign subsidies cannot receive government aid when 
the source of the funding are revenues collected via antidumping or countervailing duties.43 This is 
the first WTO decision to dictate how a government budgets sources of revenue for carrying out 
social policy. 
 In the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), there are several significant 
provisions that cover employment. The GATS provides deference for certain “Labor Markets 
Integration Agreements.”44 The GATS directs governments to devise adequate procedures to verify 
                                                
39SCM Agreement, Annex I, para. e.  This means that a government may not give exporters a rebate 
on payroll taxes paid even though rebates may be given on value-added taxes paid. 
40Id. art. 6.7(c).  Other grounds for demonstrating serious prejudice would continue to exist. 
41Id. art. 8.2(b). 
42See id. art. 31. 
43United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, Report of the Appellate Body, 
WT/DS217,234/AB/R (adopted 27 January 2003). 
44GATS art. V bis. On the role of bilateral and regional labor agreements, see Virginia Leary, Labor 
Migration, in T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Vincent Chetail (eds.), Migration and International Legal 
Norms (The Hague, Asser Press, 2003), at 227, 229. 
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the competence of foreign professionals.45 The GATS directs governments, wherever appropriate, to 
work in cooperation with relevant intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental 
organizations toward “the establishment and adoption of common international standards” for the 
practice of service trades and professions.46 The GATS forbids limitations on the total number of 
natural persons “that may be employed in a particular service sector or that a service supplier may 
employ . . . ” when such limitations are in the form of numerical quotas or the requirement of an 
economic needs test.47 
 Furthermore, the labor market is central to GATS because two of the four modes for trade in 
services can involve the movement of people.48 Mode 2 is the movement of individuals (and 
companies) to consume services in another country (e.g., training). Mode 4 is the movement of 
“natural persons” (i.e., individuals) to deliver services in another country (e.g., anti-terrorism 
services).   
 The precise boundary of Mode 4 is yet to be delineated or adjudicated. According to the 
GATS Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services Under the Agreement, the 
movement of employees is covered, but the GATS does not apply to measures affecting persons 
“seeking access to the employment market” and does not apply to measures regarding “employment 
on a permanent basis.”49 These provisions are puzzling because a worker who relocates to another 
country as an employee of a company may not be searching for a job, and yet is still statistically part 
                                                
45GATS art. VI:6 (in sectors where specific commitments are undertaken). 
46Id. art. VII:5. 
47Id. art. XVI:2(d). This discipline applies only to sectors where market access commitments are 
undertaken and may be avoided by inscribing the quota within the national schedule. 
48See GATS art. I:2; B.S. Chimni, Development and Migration, in Migration and International Legal 
Norms, supra note 44, at 256, 266. 
49GATS Annex on Movement of Natural Person Supplying Services Under the Agreement, paras. 1, 
2.   
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of the employment market of the receiving country.50 Another unknown is whether the “employment 
market” includes the self-employed who may offer various labor services. 
 Mode 4 of the GATS applies to national law governing entrance into a country (i.e., often 
termed “immigration”), the issuance of visas, and the administration of visa quotas.  This is implicitly 
shown by the Annex’s specific exclusion of measures regarding citizenship and residence,51 and by 
the statement in the Annex that GATS “shall not prevent a Member from applying measures to 
regulate the entry of natural persons into, or their temporary stay in, its territory, including those 
measures necessary to protect the integrity of, and to ensure the orderly movement of natural persons 
across, its borders, provided that such measures are not applied in such a manner as to nullify or 
impair the benefits accruing to any Member under the terms of a specific commitment.”52 In other 
words, if immigration measures necessary to protect border integrity are applied so as to impair 
specific commitments, then such measures can violate the GATS.  The applicability of the GATS to 
visas is further clarified by the footnote to Paragraph 4 of the Annex which states that: “The sole fact 
of requiring a visa for natural persons of certain Members and not for those of others shall not be 
regarded as nullifying or impairing benefits under a specific commitment.”53 What this means is that 
the mere existence of a country-specific visa formality (perhaps due to reciprocity) is not in itself to 
be considered a nullification of benefits.  
                                                
50In other words, she has access already even though she is not seeking access. For example, consider 
a transnational corporation that provides childcare services to residents in the United States through 
the use of foreign service suppliers who are already employed by the corporation and therefore 
arguably not seeking access to the U.S. labor market. The reality is that such a person operates in the 
U.S. labor market.  
51Annex on Movement of Natural Person Supplying Services Under the Agreement, para. 2. 
52Id. para. 4 (footnote omitted). 
53Id. at n. 13. 
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 Notwithstanding constitutional authority to do so,54 the GATS Council, to my knowledge, has 
not consulted with the most relevant international organizations on employment and migration 
regarding the interpretation and implementation of the Mode 4 provisions. Those organizations are 
the ILO and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). However the provisions are 
interpreted, it seems likely that the GATS will lead to a greater movement of workers across borders 
and some of those workers will decide to stay permanently. 
Summary 
 In summary, during its first decade, the WTO missed numerous opportunities to solidify a 
constructive employment dimension. The WTO did not engage in significant cooperation with the 
ILO, did not establish a Committee on Trade and Employment, did not tackle the problem of helping 
workers adversely affected by trade, and did not reauthorize the exemption for subsidies to high-
unemployment areas.  Even though the current WTO trade negotiations, known as the Doha Round, 
is ostensibly about development and poverty alleviation, the WTO has not yet agreed that 
employment is crucial to poverty alleviation. United Nations (U.N.) Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
put that matter succinctly in September 2004 when he declared: “After all, the best anti-poverty 
programme is employment.”55 Unfortunately, that simple insight has not noticeably influenced 
thinking at the WTO. 
 Given that several provisions in WTO law do pertain to employment, the WTO could have 
acknowledged that a labor dimension to WTO law already exists, and thus moved beyond the denial 
of a linkage that so often permeates WTO discourse regarding labor. Although past mistakes cannot 
be undone, the WTO can outgrow its insularity. Before discussing in Part III what the WTO should 
do, Part II will provide some historical context for thinking about social issues in trade policy. 
                                                
54GATS art. XXVI. 
55Secretary-General Affirms Commitment to Achieving Fair, Inclusive Globalization, Press Release 
SG/SM/9487/DEV/2487 (20 September 2004). 
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II.  The Awakening of Social Awareness in Trade Policy 
 As always, the beginning of wisdom in thinking about the future is looking to the past. Both 
Adam Smith and Karl Marx shared an understanding that international trade has significant social 
implications, with Smith criticizing the pathologies of protection and Marx praising the revolutionary 
potential of free trade.56 In the interwar period, the first ILO Director, Albert Thomas, offered a 
visionary synthesis of an emerging “world economy” and “new economic organisation” in which 
labor protections and free trade are complementary.57  
 On a multilateral basis, action to regulate trade for social reasons began in the early 20th 
century with conventions to restrict trade in sexual services of women (1904) and trade in toxic 
phosphorus matches (1906).58 The earliest ILO recommendation on trade came in 1919 with the 
Recommendation Concerning the Prevention of Anthrax (No. 3).  
 The efforts of the League of Nations against economic instability helped to enlighten 
pragmatic policymakers regarding the interplay between trade and employment. In 1927, the World 
Economic Conference made several recommendations on trade policy and also gave some attention 
to rationalization in industry as a means of improving the conditions of labor.59 In 1939, the Bruce 
Committee observed the phenomenon of physical, economic, and moral contagion among countries, 
and emphasized the need for international cooperation and coordination through “mutual help,” 
“exchange of knowledge,” and “association in the work of independent experts,” in contrast to the 
                                                
56See Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776), Book IV, 
chaps. ii, iii, v; Karl Marx, The Free Trade Congress at Brussels, 1847, available at < 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/09/30.htm>. 
57See Albert Thomas, International Social Policy (Geneva, ILO, 1948), at 108, 114. 
58International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, 18 May 1904, 1 LNTS 83; 
Convention respecting the Prohibition of the Use of White (Yellow) Phosphorus in the Manufacture 
of Matches, 26 September 1906, 99 BFSP 986. 
59See Wallace McClure, National Economic Independence in the Light of the International Economic 
Conference, 21 American Journal of International Law 668 (1927). 
 15
technique of “settlement by formal conferences and treaties.”60 Anticipating discoveries by social 
scientists several decades in the future, the Bruce Committee suggested that the League of Nations 
could contribute by establishing a “platform” for public knowledge and discussion in which direction 
would be given “by persons of Government rank directly concerned at home with the subjects of 
international discussion.”61 Such transgovernmental cooperation was intended to integrate both 
economic and social considerations.62 In 1944, in its Declaration of Philadelphia, the ILO noted the 
objective of a broader utilization of the world’s productive resources, including measures to promote 
a high and steady volume of international trade, and pledged ILO cooperation with such new 
international bodies as may be entrusted with these responsibilities.63 In 1945, when the U.N. Charter 
was drafted and approved, one of its provisions called for the United Nations to promote “higher 
standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and 
development.”64 
 These and other milestones over several decades set the stage for the decision by the U.N. 
Economic and Social Council in 1946 to convene a Conference on Trade and Employment. The 
governments saw trade and employment as twin issues linked in both economics and law.65 Some 
negotiators emphasized that high levels of employment could enable trade liberalization and others 
                                                
60The Development of International Co-operation in Economic and Social Affairs, Report of the 
Special Committee (Bruce Committee), Special Supplement to the Monthly Summary of the League 
of Nations, August 1939, at 7–9, 11. The Chairman of the Committee, S.M. Bruce, was a former 
Australian prime minister. 
61Id. at 17. Compare Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 2004) (discussing transgovernmental networks). 
62Bruce Committee Report, supra note 60, at 19. 
63ILO Declaration concerning the Aims and Purposes of the International Labour Organisation 
(Declaration of Philadelphia), 10 May 1944 (annexed to the ILO Constitution). 
64Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, art. 55. 
65See Susan Ariel Aaronson, Taking Trade to the Streets. The Lost History of Public Efforts to Shape 
Globalization (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2001) at 52–53. 
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emphasized that liberalization could strengthen the economy so that more employment could be 
achieved.66 Australia was the leading exponent of international undertakings on employment.67  
 The ensuing Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization (ITO) put employment 
first with a chapter on “Employment and Economic Activity.” The core commitment was for each 
member government to “take action designed to achieve and maintain full and productive 
employment and large and steadily growing demand within its own territory through measures 
appropriate to its political, economic and social institutions.”68 Furthermore, the ITO was authorized 
to initiate consultations among governments for appropriate measures against the international spread 
of a decline in employment, production or demand.69 The Employment chapter also included Article 
7 on “Fair Labour Standards” that provided for dispute settlement regarding unfairly low standards in 
another country.70 Recognizing the interconnections between the ITO and the ILO, the two 
organizations drafted a cooperation agreement in 1948.71 
 The broad intended scope of the ITO is apparent not only in the ITO’s chapter on 
“Employment and Economic Activity”, but also in its chapters on “Economic Development and 
Reconstruction” and “Restrictive Business Practices.” Several of the provisions regarding Economic 
Development and Reconstruction contain references to employment. For example, Article 10 directs 
                                                
66See Richard N. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy (London: Oxford University Press, 1956) at 
105. 
67William Adams Brown, Jr., The United States and the Restoration of World Trade (Washington, 
Brookings, 1950) at 95. 
68ITO Charter, art. 3. The text of the ITO Charter is available at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/prewto_legal_e.htm>. 
 
69Id. art. 5.2. 
70Id. art. 7. 
71Proposed Agreement between the International Labour Organisation and the International Trade 
Organisation, in ILO, Minutes of the 107th Session of the Governing Body, December 1948, at 169. 
The Agreement did not go into force due to the demise of the ITO. 
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the ITO to cooperate with other international organizations to provide finance, equipment, technical 
assistance, and managerial skills to countries that were still relatively undeveloped.72 Article 11 
authorizes the ITO to make recommendations for bilateral or multilateral agreements designed “to 
assure just and equitable treatment for the enterprise, skills, capital, arts and technology brought from 
one Member country to another.”73 
 For better or worse, the ITO did not come to fruition.  Happily, the same U.N. negotiations 
spawned the GATT which served as a caretaker for world trade order over the next four decades. 
Perhaps in an effort to distance itself from the broad aspirations for the ITO, the GATT stayed away 
from employment policy.  
 To my knowledge, the only employment-related policy engaged in by the GATT was a joint 
study with the ILO begun in 1960 to analyze the factors underlying market disruption from textile 
imports produced by low-wage workers.74 Without waiting for the study to be completed, the trade 
ministers rushed in 1961 to undertake GATT arrangements to limit trade in cotton textiles. Those 
harmful arrangements metastasized for many years and were not eliminated until 2005. After the 
GATT staff lost interest in cooperative research regarding the international division of labor, the ILO 
finalized the study and published it in 1963. The conclusion reached by the ILO was that the problem 
of the textile industries in high-wage countries “cannot be primarily attributed to the alleged 
unfairness of competition from low-wage underdeveloped countries.”75  
                                                
72ITO Charter, supra note 68, art. 10. 
73Id. art. 11.2(a)(i). 
74See Kenneth W. Dam, The GATT. Law and International Economic Organization (Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 1970) at 298–300. 
75Gardner Patterson, Discrimination in International Trade. The Policy Issues (Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1966) at 306–07 & n. 63. 
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 Unfortunately, the low-wage developing countries seeking to export their cotton and other 
apparel have been stymied for over 40 years because the GATT/WTO system has not been ready to 
accept the comparative advantage of those countries.76 Indeed, even today, some industrial countries 
use high tariffs to thwart such trade. For example, the U.S. government imposes 15 percent tariffs on 
many cotton products and 25 percent tariffs on many wool products. 
 In 1996, the WTO ministers pointed to ILO’s standards as a possible threat to the export 
aspirations of developing countries.77 This statement dripped in irony because the blame for the 
protectionism of the past 40 years cannot be attributed to labor standards or to the ILO. Instead of 
isolating itself from the ILO, WTO should recognize that the ILO can help it overcome national fears 
about import competition. 
III.  A Positive Employment Agenda for the WTO 
 The most important contribution the WTO can make to raising standards of living would be to 
tear down the protectionist walls between economies. Liberalizing trade is hardly sufficient for 
achieving human dignity and other social goals of the community. But trade liberalization is a 
constructive policy in an interdependent world economy because it typically increases purchasing 
power in each country. Although the GATT and WTO have done a lot to remove protection, a great 
deal more remains to be done—particularly in developing countries that have the greatest need for an 
                                                
76The WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing does not assert that the exports of developing 
countries being limited are unfair.  Therefore, the motivation for keeping import quotas from 1995 to 
2005 presumably was that the WTO was not ready to accept the comparative advance of low-wage 
countries.  
77The WTO Singapore Ministerial Declaration states that “We reject the use of labour standards for 
protectionist purposes, and agree that the comparative advantage of countries, particularly low-wage 
developing countries, must in no way be put into question.” WTO Singapore Ministerial Declaration, 
13 December 1996, para. 4, available at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/wtodec_e.htm>. As I pointed out after the 
Singapore Conference, the WTO ministers did not need labor standards for protectionist purposes 
because they were using trade measures for that self-defeating function. Steve Charnovitz, Trade, 
Employment and Labour Standards: The OECD Study and Recent Developments in the Trade and 
Labor Standards Debate, 11 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal 131, 156–57 (1997). 
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economic boost from trade. Quite perversely, the developing countries are often the most resistant to 
liberalization. 
 Protectionism is not an effective or ethical response to any market failure; instead, it is a 
manifestation of government failure as politically powerful rent-seeking interests are requited with 
border restrictions.78 Although trade ministers can agree to a rhetorical rejection of protectionism,79 
many of them remain eager to partake at home. Eradicating protectionism is a difficult political 
challenge for governments, and so the WTO should welcome outside offers to help. 
 Although the WTO epistemic community tends to look at employment as an output generated 
by trade negotiations, this view is incomplete in two respects. First, it fails to consider that high levels 
of employment within countries may be a necessary input for successful trade negotiations. That 
insight animated the founders of the postwar trading system who wrote the Employment chapter of 
the ITO Charter. Second, the current WTO program fails to consider the ways in which WTO rules 
may interfere with using employment policy at the national level to counter market failures and to 
increase investment in human capital. The WTO also fails to consider ways in which its cooperation 
with other international organizations, such as the ILO, could help those organizations achieve their 
own functional objectives.  
Worker Adjustment Assistance 
 A recognition that governmental assistance to workers can be a complementary policy to trade 
liberalization goes back to the first half of the 20th century, but has not yet emerged in an 
intergovernmental treaty. So far, only soft law exists. In 1976, at the World Employment Conference, 
the governments, workers, and employers agreed to a Declaration which, among many points, states 
that governments should provide worker adjustment assistance “in order to facilitate the 
                                                
78Smith, supra note 56, chap. ii. He takes note of the way that “partial interests” direct and intimidate 
the legislature, moving it away from the general good. 
79See, e.g., Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, para. 1 (adopted 20 November 2001). 
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establishment of new economic relations between developing and developed nations.”80 The 
Declaration further states that the worker delegates felt that in the context of multilateral trade 
negotiations, the ILO could “contribute to the improvement of an international safeguard system 
covering employment and income guarantees, fair labour standards and adjustment assistance.”81 In 
1985, the GATT Eminent Persons Group recommended that safeguard actions “be linked with 
adjustment assistance including help, where necessary, to ease the transfer of workers.”82 In 2005, the 
WTO Consultative Board to the Director-General explained that  
“adjustment assistance programmes reflect the political need to offset the social impact of trade 
liberalization which would otherwise not be politically sustainable.”83 The Board lamented that the 
WTO “says practically nothing, even by way of exhortations, to WTO Members and to aid-giving 
institutions, on adjustment assistance.”84 To achieve greater “horizontal coordination” on adjustment, 
the Board recommended that international development agencies, in close cooperation with the WTO 
and other agencies, undertake programs to fund adjustment assistance for developing countries.85 The 
need for adjustment programs may be greater in developing countries, than in industrial countries, 
because some developing countries (such as China) face huge transitional problems as the 
agricultural population exits from subsistence farming. 
                                                
80ILO, Declaration of Principles and Programme of Action adopted by the Tripartite World 
Conference on Employment, Income Distribution and Social Progress, and the International Division 
of Labour, June 1976, para. 66. See also para. 69 (“Adjustment assistance is considered preferable to 
import restrictions.”).   
81Id. para. 76. Also in 1976, the need for such policies was briefly discussed in the Tinbergen report. 
Jan Tinbergen (coordinator), Reshaping the International Order. A Report to the Club of Rome (New 
York, E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1976) at 113-14, 145. 
82Fritz Leutwiler et al., Trade Policies for a Better Future (Geneva, GATT, 1985) at 43. 
83Peter Sutherland et al., The Future of the WTO (Geneva, WTO, 2005), para. 172. 
84Id. para. 42. 
85Id. para. 172. 
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 Over the years, trade adjustment programs have typically been ineffectual and are regularly 
criticized by economists and derided by labor unions.86 Such programs have remained ineffective 
because their presumptive constituency—workers, employers, and free traders—are often 
uninterested in a pro-adjustment approach.87 This is not true of all academic economists however.88 
For example, in a recent book on the WTO, Kent Jones explained that “Governments have the 
responsibility to make sure that the policy environment facilitates adjustment to trade.  . . . The easier 
it is for a displaced worker to find a new job, the less will be her trepidation about trade and the 
WTO.”89 Jones does not recommend any specific action by the WTO toward that end however.  
Beyond the academy, one thoughtful study was written a few years ago by Cletus C. Coughlin, a vice 
president of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, who pointed out the need to reduce the cost for 
those harmed by trade.90 
 Worker adjustment programs are controversial in several respects: One issue is whether there 
should be specific programs targeted at workers hurt by trade, or instead more general programs to 
                                                
86For example, see the arguments by Doug Irwin, an eminent trade economist, in Douglas A. Irwin, 
Free Trade Under Fire (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2002) at 100-110. Amazingly, in my 
view, Irwin proposes to drop the requirement in U.S. law that displaced workers should be enrolled in 
appropriate training. Id. at 108.  
87See Steve Charnovitz, Worker Adjustment: The Missing Ingredient in Trade Policy, 28 California 
Management Review 156, 167 (1986). 
88The most well-known exception among trade economists is the Washington-based Institute for 
International Economics which has consistently published cutting-edge research on how to make 
better use of trade adjustment programs as a political economy strategy to improve the prospects for 
trade liberalization. The key analysts have been Robert E. Baldwin, Fred Bergsten, Gary Hufbauer, 
Catherine Mann, David Richardson, and Howard Rosen. See, e.g., C. Fred Bergsten, A New Foreign 
Economic Policy for the United States, in C. Fred Bergsten and the Institute for International 
Economics, The United States and the World Economy (Washington, Institute for International 
Economics, 2005) at 3, 18–19 (discussing the role of trade adjustment assistance as an integral 
component of U.S. foreign economic policy). 
89Kent Jones, Who’s Afraid of the WTO? (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004) at 61. 
90Cletus C. Coughlin, The Controversy Over Free Trade: The Gap Between Economists and the 
General Public, The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, January/February 2002, at 1. 
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help all workers who suffer from structural unemployment. Another issue is whether adjustment 
programs are worth the public monies being spent on them. Although a full discussion of these issues 
is beyond the scope of this article, let me briefly offer my own views. If governments undertook 
active labor market programs for all workers who needed them, then there would be no need for 
categorical programs for trade-affected workers.  Conversely, when generally-available programs are 
absent or spotty (which is the condition in nearly all countries), the ideal of treating workers equally 
is not a good reason to refrain from some groups of workers.  In other words, do not let the best be 
the enemy of the good. 
 The challenge of effectiveness is a much deeper problem because evaluations sometimes do 
not show a significant positive impact for retraining. Recognizing, however, how little resources and 
management attention have been devoted to such programs over the past 25 years, I am not surprised 
by the disappointing results.  In my view, society can help the structurally unemployed if we try.  The 
task is not just only for governments however; companies and workers themselves need to be 
engaged in the process. Thus, I agree with a statement in a recent Paper published by the World Bank 
that “Despite the mixed evaluation picture, governments have little choice but to use active 
programming as one instrument in their response to the economic and social problems associated 
with unemployment and poverty in the labor force.”91 
 Based on the U.S. experience, one mistake that has been made is to assume that adjustment 
programs can be effectively implemented by the public sector.  Instead, I would opt for a model of 
privatization of active labor market programs whereby individuals who need services are empowered 
with government-issued vouchers which individuals combine with their own money to purchase 
                                                
91Gordon Betcherman, Karina Olivas & Amit Dar, Impacts of Active Labor Market Programs: New 
Evidence from Evaluations with Particular Attention to Developing and Transition Countries, World 
Bank Social Protection Discussion Paper Series, No. 0402, January 2004, at iii. 
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needed services.  The government could encourage individual saving for that purpose through the tax 
system. 
A WTO Decision on Trade and Employment 
 As a focal point for its new efforts, the WTO should enact a Decision on Trade and 
Employment to better institutionalize the employment issue in WTO policy. Such a Decision could 
include one or more of the following specifics: 
 Restate the principle from the ITO Charter92 that the avoidance of unemployment is not 
of domestic concern alone, but is also a condition for achieving the general purposes of 
the trading system. 
 Exhort WTO Members to establish programs to assist dislocated workers and propose 
that appropriate international organizations—such as the ILO and the World Bank— 
promote informational hubs and technical assistance for counseling, retraining, mobility 
assistance, and wage insurance. Governments need help in knowing what the better 
practices are. The Decision might recall the endorsement of adjustment programs by the 
World Summit for Social Development.93  
 Propose that the World Bank set up a fund for developing countries to assist them in 
providing adjustment aid to workers dislocated by globalization. The Decision might 
recall that the idea of such international funding originated at the World Employment 
Conference in 1976.94  
 Propose that an independent mechanism be set up to collect data on the efficacy of 
national adjustment programs and to evaluate those programs, and then to put those 
results on the WTO website. 
 Propose that experimentation in social safety nets be encouraged through an 
international prize to be awarded to the most innovative and successful programs. 
 Hold GATS negotiations to lower barriers to trade in worker adjustment services.95  If 
service deliverers see a large international market in delivering such services to 
                                                
92See ITO Charter, supra note 68, art. 2.1. 
93World Summit for Social Development, Programme of Action of the World Summit for Social 
Development, para. 52(g), available at <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/wssd/agreements/index.html>. 
94Declaration, supra note 80, para. 71. Jagdish Bhagwati has endorsed this idea. Jagdish Bhagwati, In 
Defense of Globalization (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004) at 235. 
95All four GATS modes are relevant here. 
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workers, more providers will get involved and their performance will be strengthened 
through competition. 
 Expand the WTO research program and direct the WTO to work with the ILO and the 
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development to examine the impact of trade on the 
quantity and quality of employment, and the gender implications of this impact.96 The 
Decision might recall that this recommendation for joint research was made by the 
World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization.97 
 Establish a WTO Committee on Trade and Employment.98 The Committee should be 
asked to examine whether WTO rules unduly constrain adjustment programs and 
national employment promotion policies. The Decision should invite the ILO to 
participate in the new Committee through a tripartite delegation. The Committee should 
also formulate measurable objectives for the WTO regarding world employment 
growth. 
 Consider the advisability of amending GATT rules to allow any country to impose a 
small uniform fee on imports for the purpose of using the revenue from such a fee to 
fund programs for adjustment assistance.99  
In my view, the remit of a WTO Committee on Trade and Employment should be limited to these 
issues and should not include the two controversial topics discussed below—worker migration and 
fair labor standards.100 
                                                
96See Eugenia McGill, Poverty and Social Analysis of Trade Agreements: A More Coherent 
Approach?, 27 Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 371 (2004). 
97World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, A Fair Globalization (Geneva, ILO, 
2004), para. 628. James Salzman has argued that the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development can also play a useful role in research on this topic. James Salzman, Labor Rights, 
Globalization and Institutions: The Role and Influence of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, 21 Michigan Journal of International Law 769 (2000). Salzman takes issue with 
my criticisms of the OECD’s first study on the trade-labor connection. Id. at 799 n. 75. 
98I urged this in 1995. See Steve Charnovitz, Strengthening the International Employment Regime, 30 
Intereconomics 221, 233 (1995). 
99At the direction of the U.S. Congress, the President undertook negotiations in 1988 to amend the 
GATT in this way, but the negotiations proved unsuccessful. See 19 USCS § 2397 note. 
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Worker Migration 
 Commitments in trade agreements regarding the movement of people began as early as the 
year 1217, and have often been included in modern treaties on friendship, commerce, and 
navigation.101 At the U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment in 1948, the governments approved 
a Resolution suggesting that the U.N. Economic and Social Council, in conjunction with the ILO, 
consider the problems of temporary or seasonal migration of workers for the purpose of formulating 
conventions and model bilateral agreements so that governments may coordinate their actions to 
ensure mutually advantageous arrangements and fair conditions for the workers concerned.102 After 
1948, the issue of worker migration disappeared from the global trade agenda. 
 Attention to the temporary movement of workers is one of the most positive features of the 
GATS. So far, the commitments made by governments have been meager.103 Perhaps the ongoing 
                                                                                                                                                              
100To be sure, both issues relate to the trade and employment linkage. Nevertheless, I would exclude 
them for pragmatic reasons. The trade-related aspects of worker migration is a GATS issue and 
should be addressed by the WTO Council for Trade in Services or its subsidiary bodies.  The issue of 
fair labor standards is very controversial in the WTO and any proposal to authorize a committee to 
consider it would doom that proposal to failure. The author is under no delusion as to the political 
likelihood that the WTO would actually set up a Committee on Trade and Employment. But I want 
the opponents to have to articulate why such a Committee is not appropriate for the WTO without 
having the easy retort that the WTO should not deal with fair labor standards. 
101See Jean Baneth, Comment, in Anne O. Krueger (ed.), The WTO As An International Organization 
(Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1998) at 271, 274 & n. 1 (discussing the England-Norway 
commercial agreement of 1217); Herman Walker, Jr., Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation, 42 Minnesota Law Review 805, 806 (1958). 
102U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, Resolution to the Economic and Social Council 
Relating to Employment, reprinted in Michael Hart (ed.), Also Present at the Creation (Ottawa, 
Centre for Trade Policy and Law, 1995) at 237–38. 
103See Allison M. Young, What’s Next for Labor Mobility Under GATS?, in Pierré Sauve & Robert 
M. Stern (eds.), GATS 2000. New Directions in Services Trade Liberalization (Washington, 
Brookings, 2000) at 184, 187.  Governments can negotiate commitments to liberalize entry 
opportunities for foreign persons through GATS Article XVIII (Additional Commitments), or instead 
through Articles XVI:2(a), XVI:2(d), and XVII:1. 
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Doha Round will deepen those commitments.104 Allowing greater movement of persons delivering 
services can aid the economies of both sending and receiving countries, and can also help individual 
workers enhance their self-fulfillment. In the past few years, many analysts have taken note of the 
constructive potential of WTO negotiations on Mode 4.105 Freedom of movement for workers (and for 
students consuming educational services) should be a high priority, even in a time of heightened 
border insecurities. 
 In 2004, the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization pointed out “the 
lack of a coherent framework for the cross-border movement of people.”106 The Commission 
recommended the initiation of a preparatory process towards an institutional framework for the 
movement of people across national borders that would be similar to multilateral frameworks that 
already exist (or are under discussion) for goods, services, technology, investment, and 
information.107 In my view, a multilateral framework is truly needed and should involve better 
coordination between the WTO, the ILO, and the IOM.108 
Fair Labor Standards 
                                                
104See Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Industry Sees Progress in Mode 4 As Key to Success in Overall WTO 
Trade Talks, BNA Daily Report for Executives, 4 February 2005, at A-19. 
105For example, see Christine Breining-Kaufmann, Rajesh Chadha & L. Alan Winters, The 
Temporary Movement of Workers – GATS Mode 4, in L. Alan Winters & Pradeep S. Mehta (eds.), 
Bridging the Differences. Analyses of Five Issues of the WTO Agenda (Jaipur, CUTS, 2003) at 111; 
Steve Charnovitz (2003), Trade Law Norms on International Migration, in Migration and 
International Legal Norms, supra note 44, at 241; Sumanta Chaudhuri, Aaditya Mattoo & Richard 
Self, Moving People to Deliver Services: How Can the WTO Help?, 38 Journal of World Trade 363 
(2004); UN Millennium Project, Task Force on Trade, Trade for Development, § 4.4.1 (presenting 
several thoughtful proposals for Mode 4 negotiations), available at < 
http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/reports/reports2.htm>. 
106World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, supra note 97, para. 416. 
107Id. para. 444. 
108See Steve Charnovitz, Assessing the ILO’s Efforts to Develop Migration Law, 30 Legal Issues of 
Economic Integration 193 (2003). 
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 The third area of employment policy where the WTO could do more is labor standards.109 
Back in 1948, a provision on “Fair Labour Standards” was included in the ITO Charter and intended 
to be part of the trading system.110 This is still a good idea, as there are many trade-related labor 
issues—such as the working conditions in export processing zones—that are not currently being dealt 
with by the WTO.111 In recent months, the U.S. government has brought up the issue of core labor 
standards during country reviews in the WTO Trade Policy Review Mechanism.112 
 In the ITO Charter of 1948, the governments evinced a recognition that “all countries have a 
common interest in the achievement and maintenance of fair labour standards related to productivity, 
and thus in the improvement of wages and working conditions as productivity may permit.”113 That 
sentence contains several important thoughts: One is that improvements in productivity may enhance 
labor standards and wages. Another is that high labor standards not justified by productivity may not 
be beneficial. Another is that nations share a common interest in higher labor standards.  
 No intergovernmental declaration on labor standards emanated from the trading system after 
1948 for almost 50 years. Then in 1996  the WTO trade ministers at Singapore declared: “We renew 
                                                
109An excellent summary of the issue is: Trade-Labour Debate: The State of Affairs, CUTS Centre for 
International Trade, Economics & Environment Research Report (Jaipur, CUTS, 2004). The Report 
opposes a WTO role in labor standards and states that the issue should be handled by the ILO. By 
contrast, other analysts support a WTO role. See, e.g., Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization 
and the Protection of Workers’ Rights, 3 Journal of Small and Emerging Business Law 131 (1999); 
James Atleson, The Voyage of Neptune Jade: The Perils and Promises of Transnational Labor 
Solidarity, 52 Buffalo Law Review 85 (2004); Chantal Thomas, Should the World Trade 
Organization Incorporate Labor and Environmental Standards?, 61 Washington & Lee Law Review 
347 (2004). 
110See ITO Charter, supra note 68, art. 7. 
111See Kimberly Ann Elliott & Richard B. Freeman, Can Labor Standards Improve Under 
Globalization? (Washington, Institute for International Economics, 2003) at 134–35. 
1123D, Practical Guide to the WTO for Human Rights Advocates (Geneva, 3D, 2004) at 30. The 
Trade Policy Review Mechanism is chartered in the WTO Agreement, Annex 3. 
113ITO Charter, supra note 68, art. 7. 
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our commitment to the observance of internationally recognized core labour standards.”114 The WTO 
Ministers at Singapore further stated that “The International Labour Organization (ILO) is the 
competent body to set and deal with these [core] standards, and we affirm our support for its work in 
promoting them.”115 That the ILO is the competent body for labor standards is obvious, and no one 
has seriously argued that the WTO should poach on that turf. Although the statement by the Ministers 
is unobjectionable on its face, many analysts and stakeholders did object that the Ministers did not do 
anything tangible to support the ILO’s work.116 
 Because the nations of the world have a common interest in improving labor standards, they 
also share an interest in assuring that the WTO and the ILO work cohesively. The linkages are 
numerous: Emancipating international trade will increase productivity which should tend to raise 
labor standards. Improving labor conditions in countries notorious for worker rights abuses will make 
it easier for those countries to export to consumers who care about the condition of the workers 
making the goods they buy.117 Raising worker productivity will expand output and enable countries 
to better compete in trade. These potential synergies need to be developed in a way that will allow the 
trade regime to help the labor regime. 
                                                
114WTO Singapore Ministerial Declaration, supra note 77, para. 4. 
115Id. 
116See e.g., Brian Langille, Labor Rights, in P. J. Simmons & Chantal de Jonge Oudraat (eds.), 
Managing Global Issues (Washington, Carnegie Endowment, 2001) at 469, 487 (stating that the 
Singapore Declaration rejected labor standards as a fit subject matter of WTO debate and dismissed 
the ILO as marginal to the efforts of the WTO). 
117See Karen A. Tramontano, Stitching Up Global Labor Rights, Washington Post, 11 December 
2004, at A23 (discussing the example of Cambodia). 
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 The relevance of labor policy to trade policy is actually just a subset of the broader relevance 
of labor policy to economic policy.118 Workers are the most valuable resource a country has for its 
development, and yet too often during the 1970s and 1980s, active labor market programs for 
workers were neglected by the World Bank. Several years ago, the World Bank recognized the gap in 
its own efforts, and began to devote attention and resources to social protection and labor markets.119  
 A holistic vision was put forward in 1981 in the encyclical Laborem Exercens.  Pope John 
Paul II stated that “it is respect for the objective rights of the worker . . .  that must constitute the 
adequate and fundamental criterion for shaping the whole economy, both on the level of the 
individual society and State and within the whole of the world economic policy and of the systems of 
international relationships that derive from it.”120 The Pope referred to the ILO, and not the GATT, 
but surely the WTO today is one of the systems of international relationships that derive from the 
world economy. 
 Worker rights are now off the negotiating table at the WTO and likely to remain so for many 
years. Several reasons exist, but a major cause is surely Bill Clinton who as U.S. President confided 
to a reporter the coercive path he favored for worker rights at the WTO. Just before he arrived at the 
WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle in late 1999, Clinton said that he favored a WTO working 
                                                
118Friedl Weiss, Internationally Recognized Labour Standards and Trade, in Friedl Weiss, Erik 
Denters & Paul de Waart (eds.), International Economic Law with a Human Face (The Hague, 
Kluwer Law International, 1998) at 79, 106. 
119See World Development Report 2005, A Better Investment Climate for Everyone (New York, 
Oxford University Press, 2004) chap. 7 and the earlier pivotal World Development Report 1995, 
Workers in an Integrating World (New York, Oxford University Press, 1995). 
120Laborem Exercens, 14 September 1981, para. 17, available at 
<http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-
ii_enc_14091981_laborem-exercens_en.html>.  
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group to devise a set of core labor standards for trade agreements that would be enforced through 
trade sanctions.121  
 The misplaced motivation of Clinton’s remark touched off a firestorm of opposition within 
the WTO and was a factor in the failure of the Seattle Conference. By December 1999, it had become 
apparent that the issue of labor standards in the WTO was delicate, and no progress could be made in 
any proposal that endorsed trade sanctions as a way to enforce labor standards. Opinions differ on 
what Clinton’s motivation was for making his incendiary remarks; perhaps he just misspoke. 
Whatever its rationale, Clinton’s comment swept away the progress that had been made in the 
preceding years in explaining how the WTO could take up the issue of labor standards without 
committing to a sanction-based approach. 
 Several possibilities exist.  For trade in goods, one can imagine a greater use of international 
product standards to guarantee that goods are produced under healthy working conditions.  The WTO 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) calls on governments to use relevant international 
standards where they exist.122 Although the TBT Agreement appears to have been written carefully to 
preclude standards based on working conditions,123 the TBT definitions are written loosely enough 
for an expansive interpretation should governments want to do so. For trade in services, one can 
imagine stitching together several GATS provisions to promote specified labor standards in services 
sectors.124 Indeed, David Richardson, a well known trade economist, has suggests that the GATS 
                                                
121See Michael Paulson, Clinton Says He Will Support Trade Sanctions for Worker Abuse, Seattle 
Post-Intelligencer, 1 December 1999, at A1. 
122Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), art. 2.4. 
123See TBT Agreement, Annex 1, paras. 1 & 2 (referring to “related” processes and production 
methods). 
124For example, GATS arts. V bis, VII:5, XIX:2 (attaching conditions), XVIII (additional 
commitments). 
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could be expanded to cover market-supportive regulation regarding labor policies.125 His proposal 
suggests a WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Worker Agency Services to cover freedom of 
association and the right to collective bargaining. 
 If labor standards do not come into the WTO as a discrete trade issue, they may come in 
instead as a “human rights” issue. Because the United States has never pressed for its inclusion into 
the WTO, human rights does not carry the same baggage that labor rights carries. To be sure, the 
WTO member governments that have been so defensive about worker rights, such as India, might be 
similarly antagonistic to human rights as a trade goal. But given the commitment within the United 
Nations and in many countries to the primacy of human rights, one cannot easily predict the outcome 
of a concerted effort to add a human rights dimension to the WTO. In recent years, many analysts 
have written about human rights as a WTO issue in a favorable light.126 Others decry the idea of 
taking human rights into account at the WTO preferring to limit the arenas in which human rights can 
be pursued.  How this tension plays out will be interesting to watch. It may be that when the issue of 
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core labor standards eventually enters the WTO, it does so under the banner of human rights, rather 
than as a distinct objective.127 
IV. Conclusion 
 The purpose of this article is to suggest that the WTO adopt a durable employment dimension 
and to propose key elements for it. The Preamble of the WTO makes a bow to “ensuring full 
employment,” but none of the actual rules drafted during the Uruguay Round do anything concrete to 
achieve this goal. Expanding the level of international trade may increase worker remuneration and 
purchasing power, but trade is a blunt instrument for governments to use to combat structural 
unemployment and chronic poverty.  
 Instead, governments need to use appropriate employment policy. The difficulty, however, is 
that because of perceived international competition, governments may not implement the 
employment and labor policies that would be optimal for them. Similarly, dysfunctions in 
employment policy can hinder trade negotiations. Because of perceived unfairness in trade due to 
horrible labor conditions in some countries, governments may resist the acceptance of goods 
produced under such conditions. Because of labor market failures that prevent redundant workers 
from getting reemployed, governments may drag their feet in implementing trade liberalization.128 
Furthermore, WTO rules on subsidies may encroach on the policy space needed by governments.  
 The existence of these international interactions between trade and labor provide the 
justification for a comprehensive international policy to manage the trade-labor connection. One 
element is to prevent WTO rules from interfering with legitimate labor policy at the national level. 
Another is maintain a proper balance between economic and social factors of development. Another 
is to promote the employment and social preconditions for trade liberalization. Not all aspects of such 
                                                
127See Philip Alston (ed.), Labour Rights as Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
128For example, in the early 2000s, the Bush Administration imposed heavy tariffs on steel and 
endorsed new subsidies for U.S. farmers. 
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policies need to be addressed within the WTO, but even the ones outside the WTO’s competence 
might benefit from some WTO involvement. 
 Twenty years ago, I observed that jobs were replacing gold as the modern measure of a 
favorable balance of trade.129 What I meant was that poor outcomes in the labor market would 
become more of a constraint on the ability of governments to liberalize.130 I was not suggesting that 
only exports create jobs, or that imports always destroy jobs. If such effects actually occurred, that 
would turn the trade equation into a zero-sum employment game. Surely that view of trade ignores 
both theory and reality.   
 Looking back, my observation was a tad too pessimistic. In the intervening years, many 
governments have liberalized trade, often in the face of high unemployment. Nevertheless, a great 
deal more liberalization remains to be accomplished in the years ahead.  
 Poor domestic and international policies on employment creation will continue to be a drag on 
the ability of governments and societies to embrace the benefits of trade liberalization.  To remedy 
this situation, the WTO should admit that the aspirations about employment in the Preamble to the 
WTO Agreement cannot be satisfactorily achieved without the use of social policy instruments at 
both the domestic and the international levels. As a first step, the WTO’s shadowy employment 
dimension should be better developed so that the WTO works with other international agencies to 
help countries recover from globalization-induced unemployment.  
 Just as international trade policy is too important to be left to the WTO, international 
employment policy is too important to be left to the ILO (or to meetings of the G-8 Labor and 
Employment Ministers). In my view, the WTO itself has a complementary role to play. Furthermore,  
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governments need to enhance the coordination of multilateral organizations so that interconnected 
economic and social goals can be integrated and promoted more successfully.  The world community 
took up this task 60 years ago in the establishment of the U.N. Economic and Social Council (at the 
suggestion of the Bruce Committee). Sadly, the integration of social and economic objectives remains 
in its infancy. Going forward, such integration will also need to take account of environmental 
objectives. 
 In discerning the right path forward, governments and stakeholders can benefit by learning 
from history. A key development was the U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment of 1946–48 
and the creation of the GATT.  These multilateral efforts to construct economic and social 
governance had roots in an earlier era of institution-building when the ILO and League of Nations 
were created. The unique mission of the ILO called for a new building for which the foundation stone 
was installed with great ceremony in 1923 . That impressive structure, named for the internationalist 
William Rappard, now houses the WTO.  When the foundation stone was laid down, ILO Director 
Albert Thomas placed a piece of parchment under the stone on which a motto for the ILO had been 
inscribed.  The motto is: “Si vis pacem, cole justitiam.” If you wish for peace, cultivate justice.131 
That’s a good motto for the ILO and would be a good motto for the WTO.132 In the 21st century, let 
us renew global efforts to achieve those timeless aspirations. 
 
                                                
131Thomas, supra note 57, at 12. 
132To my knowledge, the WTO does not have an organizational motto. 
